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The Inattentive Participant: Portfolio Trading Behavior in 401(k) Plans  
Olivia S. Mitchell, Gary R. Mottola, Stephen P. Utkus, and Takeshi Yamaguchi  
 
While many studies have explored the determinants of employee saving behavior in US 
defined contribution (DC) saving plans,1 far less attention has been devoted to understanding 
how workers manage their assets in these plans. Nevertheless, plan sponsors, recordkeepers, 
money managers, and policymakers would benefit from a deeper understanding of how some 60 
million employees manage the $2.5 trillion in their DC pension accounts.2  This paper draws on a 
rich new dataset of more than 1,500 retirement plans to analyze trading patterns of some 1.2 
million active participants in 401(k) plans over the 2003-04 period.  We relate a number of 
portfolio outcomes to employee characteristics as well as plan design features and participant 
investment choices.  Our results suggest that most 401(k) plan participants exhibit high levels of 
inertia: over our two-year period, most people never execute any trades in their pension 
portfolios, and even among traders, portfolio turnover rates are one-third the rate of professional 
money managers.  In this period of rapidly rising stock prices, there is no evidence of portfolio 
rebalancing among the vast majority of participants.  The few who do trade in their 401(k) plans 
are more affluent, older men, with higher incomes and longer job tenure. They tend to use the 
internet for 401(k) account access, hold a larger number of investment options, and are more 
likely to hold active equity funds rather than index or lifecycle funds. Certain plan design 
features, notably the presence of company stock, raise trading levels, even after controlling for 
differences in employee demographic characteristics.  In general, most workers tend to buy and 
hold their pension portfolios and are inattentive to ongoing portfolio management. 
 Our findings suggest several questions worthy of future research. First, while it is clear 
that most participants are inattentive to their portfolios, it remains to be seen whether this 
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inactivity is motivated by lack of awareness regarding recommended practices such as 
rebalancing, or whether it signals interia, implying that despite being aware of best practices 
participants require additional assistance to manage their portfolios. Second, our analysis 
underscores the importance of distinguishing between alternative measures in evaluating the 
impacts of portfolio trading.  Factors such as employee demographics, plan design, or participant 
holdings, can all have quite different effects depending on whether the measure is the propensity 
to trade, the propensity to be an active trader, the number of portfolio trades, or portfolio 
turnover.  Third, because only a tiny minority of participants trades actively, any efforts to 
address the costs due to excessive trading would need to be targeted on the small group of active 
participants.  
 In what follows, we first offer an overview of related literature, and then we turn to a 
high-level description of trading activity in our dataset.  Next we describe our empirical 
approach, discuss findings, and outline implications. 
 
Related Studies  
Why might retirement investors alter their portfolios or ‘trade’ their pension accounts?  
Theoretical finance explanations have built on the capital asset pricing framework, where 
portfolio choice is believed to reflect investor risk preferences, given an efficient set of available 
investment opportunities.  From this perspective, portfolio shifts are predicted if preferences 
change or when investors alter their forecasts of expected returns and risk (taking into account 
the transaction costs of trading). In other words, the rational investor trades when the marginal 
benefit of trading equals or exceeds his marginal cost (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980).   
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Whether these costs and benefits change systematically as investors age is a point of 
some debate. For instance, Samuelson’s (1969) theoretical approach argued that rational 
investors would hold a fixed equity allocation over their lifetime, regardless of age or wealth 
(and given identically and independently distributed returns over time, among other 
assumptions).  From this viewpoint, portfolio reallocations or trading would then be attributable 
to changing return expectations, rebalancing due to fluctuating asset prices, or perhaps the 
reassessment of manager skill (if the investor employs active portfolio managers).  More recent 
research suggests that an inverse correlation between age and human capital risk should lead 
investors to hold less risky portfolios as they age, generating age-related trading away from 
equities.3 This latter view is consistent with advice offered by many retirement calculators and 
advisers, who recommend that investors design their portfolio allocations as a function of their 
goals, risk tolerance, and other factors such as the job security or presence of some other pension 
plan.  From this perspective, portfolio trading other than periodic rebalancing would be expected 
to occur relatively rarely, and it might be particularly associated with an investor’s age.4    
Empirical studies on investor trading behavior are quite recent, and some of the most 
widely-cited research relies on data from investors with self-directed brokerage accounts.  In one 
influential paper, Barber and Odean (2000) concluded that active traders realize substantially 
lower returns than do nontraders.5  Their sample also turned over more than 75% of its common 
stock portfolio annually. This finding lends support to “overconfidence theory,” whereby overly-
optimistic investors trade too frequently and to their detriment, as a result of a too-rosy 
estimation of their own investment skills (Odean 1999; Gervais and Odean, 2001). Follow-up 
research, again on discount brokerage accountholders, reported a raw male/female gap of 45% in 
portfolio turnover (Barber and Odean 2001); the gap diminishes somewhat, to 23%, when 
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controlling for demographic factors.6  The overall average turnover rate for this sample of 
brokerage investors was quite high, about 6% on a monthly basis (or 72% annually).7      
On the face of it, it seems quite unlikely that 401(k) plan participants would exhibit 
turnover rates as high as a group of self-directed brokerage account holders, yet relatively few 
studies have evaluated this issue. In an analysis of participants in higher-education 403(b) plans, 
Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) report that almost three-quarters of those participants never changed 
their investment holdings over a 10-year period. Whether their findings may be generalized to 
the broader 401(k) universe is not yet known.  In a study of a single large corporate 401(k) 
pension, Madrian and Shea (2001) report that participants who were automatically enrolled did 
not change their investment allocations much over time, instead remaining in the conservative 
cash fund selected by their employer as the default account.  Another study of a single plan by 
Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén (2003) again finds strong evidence of 401(k) participant inertia, 
with almost 90% of plan participants making no trades in a given year.  Those authors also report 
an average of 0.26 trades per year (or about one trade every four years), with a mean annualized 
portfolio turnover rate of 16%.  Interestingly, men trade 56% more often than women, and 
portfolio turnover of male traders is 53% higher than female traders.  Whether these results can 
be generalized is again unclear, since that company had previously permitted participants to 
invest only in a stable-principal investment contract fund, so participants held only one-quarter 
of their plan money in equities. This is a low fraction compared to 401(k) plans generally.8  
Two studies have explored the role of internet access on account trading behavior. Barber 
and Odean (2002) focus again on discount brokerage investors, and they conclude that investors 
who switch to internet trading are also those who trade more frequently, hold more speculative 
investments, and see their investment performance deteriorate.  Choi, Laibson, and Metrick 
  
5
(2002b) compare trading patterns prior to and post internet trading access, and they suggest that 
trading frequency doubles, while turnover rises only by half when online trading is introduced, 
particularly among young, male, and wealthier participants. As we note below, of course, it is 
unclear whether investors planning to trade also choose to adopt internet account access, or 
whether internet access in and of itself induces more trading. 
Another factor of particular interest in 401(k) plans is whether there are the links between 
employee trading patterns and plan design decisions made by the employer.  Investment 
decisions in 401(k) plans are the joint outcome of employers’ selection of investment offerings, 
and participants’ elections among the available options.  While past research has not addressed 
this issue specifically in the trading context, a handful of studies have linked plan menu design 
and participant behaviors of other sorts. For instance, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) infer from 
experimental evidence that menu design can lead participants to naively diversify their 
portfolios; Elton, Gruber and Blake (2004), argue that some 401(k) investment menus prevent 
participants from constructing efficient portfolios; and Iyengar, Huberman and Jiang (2004) 
suggest that participants may suffer from “choice overload,” where complex investment menus 
discourage participation in the plan. In what follows, we focus not only on trading patterns by 
investor characteristics, but also how menu design may shape trading outcomes.9 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
Our dataset consists of a two-year extract of 401(k) plans and participants drawn from the 
recordkeeping systems of Vanguard from 2003 to 2004.  The same encompasses 1,530 defined 
contribution retirement plans and includes asset allocation and trading patterns for nearly 1.2 
million active participants in those plans.10   
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Plan-level statistics.  Table 1 provides key plan-level descriptive statistics: for instance, we see 
that the average plan has 776 active participant accounts with assets of $38.4 million.  These 
plans offer an average of 17 investment choices.  Almost all plans include one or more equity 
index funds; half of plans offer lifecycle funds;11 15% offer employer stock (also known as 
company stock); 93% offer one or more international options; and only 3% offer a brokerage 
option.12  Nearly three-quarters of the sample plans permit participants to take a loan from their 
own plan assets (up to a legal maximum).  The vast majority of the plans (90%) permit employee 
contributions; only a few are completely employer-financed.13   
Table 1 here 
Participant-level statistics.  While the plan-level measures of our dataset are heavily skewed 
toward small firms, the 1.2 million participants in the sample are mainly found in the larger 
firms.14  Some 68% of the participant accounts in our sample are found in the largest 10% of 
plans; 97% of participant accounts are in the top half of plans.  Since our trading analysis is 
conducted at the participant, rather than the plan level, our universe is more characteristic of the 
participant behavior found at medium- and large-sized firms.15  
Panel A of Table 2 provides summary statistics at the participant account level.  It shows 
that the average plan participant has a 401(k) account balance of more than $86,000,16 is 44 years 
old, has been on the job for eight years, and has an average household income of just over 
$88,000.  About half the sample is identified as male and about a quarter female (another quarter 
of accounts lack an identifier for sex); the ratio of men to women is approximately 2:1 assuming 
no bias in missing data.  Table 2 also indicates the distribution of imputed non-retirement 
household financial assets: 32% of the participants are classified low wealth, 45% as medium 
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wealth, and 23% as high wealth.17   Some 37% of the participants are registered to access their 
account via the internet (as of January 2003).   
Table 2 here 
Panel B of Table 2 reports on 401(k) plan features offered and actually taken up by 
sample participants.  It is interesting that the average participant has access to nearly 18 options 
in his plan, but he utilizes only 3.5 investment funds in his investment portfolio.  Earlier, we saw 
that 15% of plans offers employer stock, but since these are the larger firms, over half (52%) of 
the participants have access to employer stock and one-third (32%) holds an employer stock 
investment. Almost all of participants have access to equity index funds (99%) and international 
funds (98%), but only one-half (53%) and a fifth (20%), respectively, actually invest in these 
choices. Another notable finding is that some 85% of participants have access to a 401(k) loan 
feature, but only 11% have a loan outstanding.   
Trading Patterns. Of particular interest, of course, is an overview of 401(k) trading activity in 
our dataset. It is worth noting that a substantial portion of observed asset movement turns out to 
be sponsor-initiated rather than participant-initiated. Employers have responsibility for designing 
the fund menu offered to participants, and they may periodically add or delete fund choices in 
response to changing investment manager process or performance or other concerns.18  When a 
new investment option is added, the sponsor will typically provide information on the new fund 
and will allow participants to decide whether or not to invest in it. But when a fund is to be 
deleted, the sponsor will typically notify participants and after a certain period will transfer any 
remaining holdings in the deleted fund to another fund in the plan.  In the latter case, this will 
generate observed trading which is employer-initiated rather than employee-driven.  To estimate 
the extent of such activity we examined asset balances by fund and plan over time; if the assets 
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in a given fund declined by 98% or more in a given month, we excluded all trading in the fund in 
that one month as “sponsor-initiated.”19  
Evidently, this sort of plan sponsor behavior accounts for a meaningful volume of gross 
401(k) trading activity over the 2003-04 period. Table 3 defines a “trade” as a fund purchase and 
sale occurring on a given day in a single account (this is because 401(k) purchases and sales are 
only priced once per day).20  Here we see that 30% of accounts had at least one trade over the 
period, with one-third of the trades classified as sponsor-initiated. Similarly, the mean number of 
trades over the two-year period is 0.76, but adjusting for sponsor-initiated trading, the average 
falls to 0.60.  Accordingly, about 20% of all trades are therefore sponsor-related (=0.16/0.76). In 
the remainder of this paper, we focus attention only on participant-initiated trading activity.  
Table 3 here    
After these adjustments for sponsor-related trading, four-fifths of the accounts experience 
no participant-directed trades at all over a two-year period. This lack of activity is reflected in a 
variety of trading statistics.  For all accounts, including traders and non-traders, the mean number 
of trades is 0.6 per account over two years.  Portfolio turnover, defined as the average amount 
traded divided by the average balance,21 is 18% over the two-year period.  For traders these 
measures are higher: the mean number of trades for accounts with trading is 3 over two years; 
the mean two-year turnover is 90%)  Medians are dramatically lower and underscore the skewed 
distribution of trading activity.  For the entire sample, the median number of trades and turnover 
rate over two years is zero; for those trading, the median number of trades is 1 and median two-
year turnover is 48%.  We also define “active traders” as the subset of participants having 6+ 
trades over two years (representing the top 2% of accounts).  For this group portfolio activity is 
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far greater, as the mean number of trades is 13 (9 median) and the mean portfolio turnover rate is 
347% (median 162%) over the period.  
A summary distribution of the number of trades across all accounts and for active traders 
appears in Table 4, and histograms are provided in Figures 1 and 2.  What is most striking is the 
very low level of trading.  Not only do very few people trade at all, but even those who do trade 
are fairly inactive.  A second striking feature is the “fat tailed” phenomenon of trading, with the 
percentage of participants falling dramatically as the level of trading increases.   
Table 4 and Figures 1 and 2 here 
It is interesting to compare 401(k) trading patterns with trading outcomes reported in 
other studies. For instance, Reid and Millar (2004) estimate a mean portfolio turnover rate of 
117% (with a median of 65%) for US professional equity mutual fund managers as a whole. 
This, of course, is far higher than our sample, since 80% of our sample executes zero trades, and 
of the 20% who do trade, the median annualized turnover rate during the two-year period is 24% 
or one-third the turnover rate of professional equity fund managers.22  Even our most active 
401(k) traders (the top 2%) have an annualized turnover rate of only 162%, equivalent to about 
the top half of equity fund managers in terms of turnover. Ultimately, for our sample, there is 
very little evidence of rebalancing or other trading activity: that is, it appears that most 401(k) 
plan participants are characterized by profound inertia, tending to buy and hold. 
 
Multivariate Analysis of Trading Patterns 
The purpose of the multivariate empirical analysis is to explore the role of three sets of 
factors as influences on 401(k) plan trading activity.  First, we seek to test whether and how 
employee characteristics influence pension trading. For instance, we wish to determine whether, 
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as noted in previous studies, men tend to exhibit disproportionate portfolio churning as compared 
to women.  Second, we hypothesize that plan features will influence trading patterns. Since the 
dataset includes an exceptional variety of plan designs, we should be able to disentangle the 
effects of plan design versus employee demographics on trading.  Finally, we evaluate how plan 
trading patterns are related to actual investment holdings.  For example, investors who hold 
passive index equity funds may also be those less likely to trade subsequently, as compared to 
people who invest in actively managed equity funds—perhaps because they tend to be believers 
in capital market efficiency.  Conversely, people who invest in their own employer’s stock may 
trade more if they believe they can outperform market indexes or if they have “inside” 
information (Mitchell and Utkus, 2004). 
For the ith participant account in the jth plan, we relate four participant trading measures 
(summarized here as the TRADINGi,j vector) to a set of employee demographic characteristics 
(DEMOi,j), plan design features offered to plan participants (PDj), and (in a subset of cases) 
measures of participants’ own account holdings prior to the beginning of the trading analysis 
(ACCTi,j):  
jijijjiji ACCTPDDEMOTRADING ,,32,10, εββββ +⋅++⋅+=   . 
So as to compare our results with prior studies, model A is estimated with demographics only, 
model B adds plan design factors, and model C adds account holdings.23  The four dependent 
variables include: TRADER: a dummy (1/0) variable indicating whether the participant account 
included a trade or not over the 2003-04 period; ACTIVE TRADER: a dummy (1/) variable 
indicating whether the participant account included six or more trades over that same period; 
NTRADES: the total number of trades the participant had over the period; and TURNOVER: the 
participant’s two-year turnover rate (analyzed for both non-traders and traders alike).  Since the 
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first two dependent variables are (0/1) indicators, they are estimated as Probit models.24 
NTRADES is estimated using a negative binomial count regression.25  The fourth dependent 
variable, TURNOVER, is estimated as a censored Tobit regression.26   The TRADER, NTRADES 
and TURNOVER regressions are estimated for the entire sample of traders and non-traders; the 
ACTIVE TRADER regression, for the “active” population executing six or more trades over the 
two-year period. 
 
Empirical Findings  
Table 5 provides estimated marginal effects for the key and statistically significant 
variables of interest. 27  Coefficient estimates for all regression models appear in Appendix 
Tables A1-4.28  
Across the board, the most robust finding across all model specifications is the coefficient 
on the participant’s sex: all else constant, men are much more likely to be traders, to be active 
traders, to execute more trades, and to have higher portfolio turnover rates than women.  For 
instance, the probability that a male will trade over a two-year period is 24% versus 17% for an 
otherwise similar female participant, a relative difference of 40%.  Men are also predicted to 
execute 91% more trades than similar female participants, and they churn their portfolios at a 
rate 41-55% higher than women.  It is worth noting that the interpretation of this effect also 
depends on how the results are framed.  For example, it is also correct to conclude that 76% of 
men are non-traders versus 83% of women, a “non-trading” differential of only 7%.  Similarly, 
while men are more likely to be active traders, this is a small group in practical terms.  The 
quantitative differences in turnover rates by sex are also small. Thus while we confirm the 
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Barber and Odean (2001) view that “boys will be boys,” perhaps the more salient observation is 
that most men and women do not trade in their 401(k) plans in the first place.  
Table 5 here  
 Another important result has to do with the influence of other financial wealth on 401(k) 
trading (controlling on other factors, including income).  Table 5 shows that higher-wealth 
participants are more likely to trade, to be active traders, and to execute more trades, than low-
wealth participants, a conclusion that could indicate that better-off households have more 
experience, knowledge, or level of engagement with financial matters generally, which then 
spills over into the 401(k) plan arena.29  Turnover rates are substantially higher for high net 
worth households.   
 The other employee-side factors we control on include participant age, income, and plan 
tenure, and these also have some relationship to trading incidence but have a smaller impact than 
sex and wealth.  For example, at the margin, being 10 years older (versus a mean age of 44) is 
associated with only a 5-12% increase in the probability of trading, and a 6-14% increase in 
portfolio turnover. Aging, thus, is associated with higher levels of portfolio attentiveness—
although again this is in the context of the vast majority of younger and older participants not 
trading in the first place.  In addition, whether higher trading later in life is due to systematic age-
based selling of equities or to other types of trading, remains to be seen.  Changes in household 
income of one standard deviation ($60,000 in household income) and job tenure (7 years) are 
associated with similar single to double-digit relative differences on various trading measures, 
including turnover rates.  Of three important demographic characteristics—age, tenure and 
income—tenure appears to have the stronger relative impact on all measures of trading.  It has 
been said, in the context of 401(k) savings, that “stayers are savers” (Even and Macpherson, 
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2004).  At the margin, our results suggest that “stayers are also traders”—again, in the context 
that the overwhelming majority of long-tenured participants do not trade in the first place.    
 Turning now to the impact of plan design on trading patterns, we see that perhaps the 
most significant factor influencing trading is the presence of company stock in the plan 
investment menu. While this is associated with statistically higher trading probabilities, more 
trades and higher turnover, the empirical magnitudes are relatively modest: for instance, in a plan 
lacking employer stock, the probability that a participant will trade is 19% over two years, versus 
21% if company stock is offered. Of course this is a relative difference of 13%, but the absolute 
magnitudes are close in practical terms.  Turnover is higher due to company stock as well—by 
about 12% in one specification.  In other words, participants with access to company stock are, at 
the margin, more likely to churn their portfolios at a somewhat higher rate.  This finding is 
interesting in light of our conversations with plan sponsors and recordkeepers who note that 
employer stock is often associated with active 401(k) trading. Our findings suggest two 
motivations for this higher trading: plans offering company stock may have workforce 
characteristics that contribute to higher trading levels generally (older, higher income, longer 
tenure, more male), and also employer stock appears to have its own distinct influence on trading 
activity independent of these characteristics.   
Turning to other plan design features, we find that increasing the number of funds offered 
by the plan does boost the probability of having active traders, but it has contradictory effects on 
turnover depending on the specification.  Our tentative conclusion is that the number of funds 
does not appear to influence aggregate trading levels.  Offering of a brokerage option within the 
401(k) plan has a large impact on trading activity and turnover rates, though the impact in 
practical terms is still small since only 3% of participants are currently offered such an option.  
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Also, in the case of the brokerage option, we measure trading only in the non-brokerage 
component of the 401(k) account.  Part of this higher trading may be due to greater movement 
among the regular fund options in the account; another part is likely due to the movement of 
money from these regular fund options to the brokerage feature.30   
As noted above, Model C findings also include controls for participants’ account 
holdings, and it stands to reason that participants’ initial account status (e.g. their equity mix, 
whether they are registered for internet trading) will be correlated with subsequent trading 
outcomes. In fact, several interesting patterns emerge. For instance, individuals who registered 
for internet access to their accounts are three times more likely to be traders and nine times more 
likely to be active traders; they also execute five times as many trades.  Turnover rates also differ 
markedly: non-web registered participants are predicted to have a 13% turnover rate versus a 
48% turnover rate for web-registered participants, a 251% relative difference.  In other words, 
401(k) participants who are internet users have higher turnover rates and they use the web to 
engage in smaller, more frequent trades.  That said, there remains the unsolved question 
regarding causality, as to whether participants who trade more gravitate to internet trading, or 
whether making internet trading available itself provoke more trading.    
The other results indicate that participants who initially have their money allocated across 
larger numbers of funds are more likely to trade.  Participants who own company stock appear to 
have higher turnover, but holdings of company stock per se do not contribute to higher overall 
trading rates or larger numbers of trade.  Overall, the employee’s decision to own company stock 
(once it is offered) appears to have a smaller effect on trading, than does the sponsor’s initial 
choice of company stock for the plan investment menu     Those with brokerage accounts are 
more frequent traders and have higher turnover levels.  (They are also less than 1% of all 
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participants and so this effect is not broadly economically meaningful.) Meanwhile, those who 
initially hold index or lifecycle funds are subsequently less likely to be traders and have lower 
turnover rates.  We also note that, in this sample, participants who hold international funds 
actually were less likely to trade, suggesting that at least most of these participants were not 
attempting to engage in international arbitrage trading. Finally, those who had taken out a loan 
from their accounts are less likely to trade, and turnover rates in aggregate are lower too.   
Comparison with prior studies.  Compared to the single 401(k) plan examined by Agnew et al. 
(2003) during the mid-1990s, we report a surprisingly similar level of the incidence of trading 
despite differences in sample size and time period: 21% of our accounts had at least one trade 
over two years (10% annualized), versus approximately 12% of their accounts with at least one 
trade per year.  Our mean number of trades (0.6 over two years, 0.3 annualized) is very similar to 
the earlier paper’s mean number of trades of 0.26.  Yet our portfolio turnover rates (18% over 
two years, 9% annualized) are half the 16% annualized for their single 401(k) plan.  Not 
surprisingly, all 401(k) results, both ours and those of Agnew et al. (2003), pale in comparison to 
the 72% annualized turnover rate for the discount brokerage account holders of Barber and 
Odean (2001).  
Like the two prior studies, we also find a pronounced effect of the participants’ sex on 
trading, but there is still considerable cross-study variation in magnitudes.  In our demographics-
only models, designed to mirror the empirical models used in these prior studies, men are 40% 
more likely to be traders, they execute 91% more trades, and their portfolio turnover is 55% 
higher than for women.  By comparison, Agnew et  al. (2003) find a lower sex-related incidence 
of number of trades, with single males executing 30% more trades than single females (versus 
our 91%), yet a comparable rate of turnover, with male turnover 50% higher than female 
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turnover (versus our 55%).  Barber and Odean (2001) report that “men trade 45% more than 
women,” when measured in terms of portfolio turnover, although as noted earlier, this refers to 
sample means differences while the marginal effects are much smaller.  It would appear, 
strikingly, that sex matters more for 401(k) plans than self-directed brokerage accounts, perhaps 
because of the self-selection inherent in brokerage account investing.  Unlike the other studies, 
our estimated effects due to sex are meaningful despite controls for non-financial wealth.  Like 
Agnew et al. (2003), we find that age, job tenure, and income influence trading, with the tenure 
effect particularly pronounced.  These effects are generally smaller than for sex and other wealth.   
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Based on our analysis of who trades in 401(k) plans, we conclude that, at least over our 
two-year period of analysis, participants are generally inattentive in their oversight of retirement 
plan assets. Four of five accounts execute no participant-driven trades, even though the stock 
market (as measured by the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index) rose by a cumulative 43% over the 
study period. In other words, for the overwhelming majority of retirement savers, there is no 
evidence of portfolio rebalancing, shifts in risk tolerance with age, or tactical portfolio changes.  
It remains to be seen whether such portfolio inertia serves participants well given the investment 
choices they have available to them. 
The few people who are traders are likely to be older affluent men, with higher incomes 
and longer job tenure; they use the internet to access their 401(k) plan accounts; hold more funds 
in their portfolios, and at the margin they invest in active equity funds while steering clear of 
lifecycle and equity index funds.  While some of the measured differences in behavior confirm 
those in prior studies—the male/female difference in propensity to trade is positive, statistically 
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significant and, in our case, 40% in relative terms—it is crucial to emphasize the low base: fewer 
than one-quarter of the men trade in a two-year period versus 17% of the women. Employer plan 
design features such as offering company stock or a brokerage option do influence some trading 
outcomes including aggregate portfolio turnover rates.   
Our analysis will be extended in future work in at least two directions.  First, the panel 
we use here covers only the 2003-04 period. This was an exceptionally salubrious period for 
stock market investing, with US stock prices gaining more than 40%.  In the future, we will 
expand the panel by including new periods and by reconstituting information for the 2000-02 
bear market.  Second, this analysis offers a cross-sectional view of the panel, modeling trading 
over this period from a variety of perspectives.  We will take on a more detailed time-series 
approach as the panel expands over time.    
 In conclusion, we offer thoughts on the implications of our results for sponsors, fund 
managers, and policymakers.  One interpretation is that the portfolio inertia identified here 
suggests that participants may require additional help managing their portfolios.  Automatic 
rebalancing services, lifecycle funds, and managed accounts can be useful in ensuring that 
sensible portfolio management takes place on a disciplined schedule—whether in 401(k) plans, 
public sector DC pensions, or even in a reformed Social Security system with private accounts.  
But any these programs necessarily will raise aggregate turnover rates, given that for most 
participants, current turnover rates are already zero. 
Another consideration is that any assessment of trading at the plan level must account for 
the critical influence of plan design as well as workforce demographics.  Certain employee 
populations (older, more male participants, longer-tenured, etc.)  will be likely to trade more 
simply because of their demographic characteristics.  Trading levels are also higher under 
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specific plan design circumstances, notably when the employer’s stock is offered, or when a 
401(k) brokerage option is provided (currently offered to only a small number of participants).  
Finally, employee preferences for certain assets (e.g., index funds versus brokerage accounts) 
and account features (web registration) will also influence trading outcomes. Our analysis also 
shows that it is typically the demographic and account holdings, rather than plan design per se, 
that appear to have the strongest effects on trading.  A final point to emphasize is that only a 
small group of participants is ever involved in active trading.  This set of active traders raises 
transaction costs for all participants, and their activities may be disruptive to portfolio managers.  
Accordingly, those seeking to reduce active trading in 401(k) plans may seek to target remedial 
policies on this specific sub-set of investors. 
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Table 1.  Plan-Level Statistics for Analysis of 401(k) Plan Trading Behavior 
Variable name Mean Value
Plan size
  Number of active participant accounts NUM_PRT 776
  Plan assets ($ millions) PLAN_ASSETS $38.4
  Plan assets (ln) LNPLAN_ASSETS 17.5
Plan design features offered
  Number of funds NFUNDS 16.6
  Index equity funds EQUITY_IND_FLG 98.8%
  Lifecycle funds LC_FND_FLG 48.8%
  Company stock CS_FLG 15.0%
  International funds INTER_FLG 93.1%
  Brokerage option VBO_FLG 3.1%
  Loan LOAN_FLG 74.3%
  Employee contributions EECONTRIB 91.8%  
 
Note: 
Number of 401(k) plans in sample= 1,530 
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Table 2.  Participant (Account-Level) Statistics for Analysis of 401(k) Plan Trading Behavior 
 
Panel A.  Participant Characteristics 
 
Variable name Mean
Demographics
  Age AGE 43.5
  Household income HH_INC 88,003$       
  Household income (ln) LNHH_INC 11.4
  Plan tenure (years) TENURE 8.0
  Sex
     Male MALE 48.0%
     Female FEMALE 26.2%
     Missing MALEMS 25.8%
  Non-retirement financial wealth
     Low wealth POOR 32%
     Middle wealth MIDDLE 45%
     High wealth RICH 23%
401(k) Account Features
  Account balance BLN_PRT 86,363$       
  Web registered WEB 37%
  Equity allocation 66.2%  
 
 
Panel B.  Plan Features Offered versus Features Held (Account-Level) 
 
Variable 
name Mean
Variable 
name Mean
Plan features offered Account holdings (12/02)
  Number of funds NFUNDS 17.7          Number of funds NFUNDS_HELD 3.5          
  Index equity funds INDEX 99%   Index equity funds INDEX_HELD 53%
  Lifecycle funds LC 47%   Lifecycle funds LC_HELD 12%
  Company stock CS 52%   Company stock CS_HELD 32%
  International funds INTL 98%   International funds INTL_HELD 20%
  Brokerage option BROK 5%   Brokerage option BROK_HELD 0.1%
  Loan LOAN 85%   Loan LOAN_HELD 11%
  Employee contributions EECONTRIB 94%   Employee contributions EECONTRIB 88%  
 
Note: 
Number of plan participants = 1,186,554 
See text for definition of financial wealth.   
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Table 3.  Summary of Two-Year Trading Statistics (1/2003-12/2004) 
  
Mean (median) trading patterns        For all accounts*            For traders only*       For active traders only*
Accounts 
with any 
trading
% of 
Accounts 
with 
Trading NTRADES TURNOVER NTRADES TURNOVER NTRADES TURNOVER
All trading activity 367,283 30.1% 0.76 (0.00) 23.7% (0.00%) 2.44 (1.00) 76.5% (42.0%) 12.68 (9.00) 340.0% (160.4%)
Less: sponsor-initiated (123,885)    -9.6%
Participant trading 243,398 20.5% 0.60 (0.00) 18.4% (0.00%) 2.92 (1.00) 89.7% (47.7%) 12.86 (9.00) 346.9% (162.4%)
* Note: Traders are those having 1 or more trades over the two-year period; active traders are those with six or more trades over two years.  NTRADES
are the number of trades in a two-year period for traders and non-traders.  TURNOVER is the percent portfolio turnover rate for both traders and non-traders.
 
Note: 
Number of plan participants = 1,186,554 
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Table 4.  Distribution of Key Trading Measures (1/2003-12/2004) 
 
Panel A.  Distribution of Number of Trades   
 
NTRADES Percent
 Number of 
accounts 
0 79.5% 943,156               
1 10.9% 129,504               
2-5 7.4% 87,864                 
6-50 2.2% 25,585                 
Over 50 0.04% 445                      
100.00% 1,186,554             
 
Panel B.  Distribution of Participant Turnover   
TURNOVER Percent
 Number of 
accounts 
0% 79.5% 943,192               
0-50% 10.6% 125,775               
50-100% 5.3% 63,006                 
100-200% 3.1% 36,783                 
200%-500% 1.1% 12,933                 
Over 500% 0.4% 4,865                   
99.6% 1,186,554             
 
Note: 
Number of plan participants = 1,186,554 
 
  
27
Table 5.  Summary of Predicted Marginal Effects (1/03-12/04) 
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Table 5 (cont’d).  Summary of Predicted Marginal Effects  
 
Note: 
Number of plan participants = 1,186,554 
Column A = demographics only; B = demographics and plan design; C = demographics, plan design and 12/02 account holdings 
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Figure 1.  Distribution of Number of Trades (1/03-12/04) 
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Note: 
Number of plan participants = 1,186,554 
 
 
Figure 2.  Distribution of Portfolio Turnover (1/03-12/04) 
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Note: 
Number of plan participants = 1,186,554 
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Appendix Table A1.  Multivariate Analysis of the Probability of Trading: Regression Coefficients  
 
Probit model specification
(A) -- Demographics only
(B) -- Demographics and plan design features offered
(C) -- Demographics, plan design and account holdings on Dec. 2002
Mean TRADER (mean: 20.5%)
Demographics (A) (B) (C) 
AGE 43.5 0.003 *** 0.004 *** 0.008 ***
TENURE 8.0 0.014 *** 0.014 *** 0.009 ***
MALE 47.5% 0.242 *** 0.239 *** 0.187 ***
HH_INC (ln) 88.0 0.118 *** 0.116 *** 0.065 ***
MIDDLE 45% 0.163 *** 0.157 *** 0.099 ***
RICH 23% 0.291 *** 0.279 *** 0.188 ***
Plan design features offered
NFUNDS 17.7 0.009 -0.004
NFUNDS2 495.1 0.000 0.000
INDEX 99% -1.079 * -1.15 *
INTL 98% 0.186 ** 0.182 **
CS 52% 0.086 ** 0.018
BROK 5% 0.194 *** 0.135 *
LC 47% -0.027 0.023
LOAN 85% -0.091 * -0.089
EECONTRIB 94% 0.247 0.201
PLANASSETS 414,818 0.004 -0.011
Account holdings (Dec 2002)
WEB 37% 0.756 ***
NFUNDS_HELD 3.5 0.068 ***
INDEX_HELD 53% -0.063 ***
INTL_HELD 20% -0.091 ***
CS_HELD 32% 0.060 *
BROK_HELD 0% 0.730 ***
LC_HELD 12% -0.091 ***
LOAN_HELD 11% -0.083 ***
Observations 1,186,554 1,186,554 1,186,554
-log(L) 581,429 577,103 532,166
Pseudo R-squared 3.4% 4.2% 11.6%
Chi-square 8,652 *** 89,874 ***
All models are Probits.
***: significant at the 1% confidence level
**: significant at the 5% confidence level
*: significant at the 10% confidence level
Sector variables and missing dummy variables included but not reported.
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Appendix Table A2.  Multivariate Analysis of the Probability of Being an Active Trader: 
Regression Coefficients  
 
Probit model specification
(A) -- Demographics only
(B) -- Demographics and plan design features offered
(C) -- Demographics, plan design and account holdings on Dec. 2002
Mean          ACTIVE TRADER (mean: 2.2%)
Demographics (A) (B) (C) 
AGE 43.5 0.005 *** 0.006 *** 0.010 ***
TENURE 8.0 0.017 *** 0.015 *** 0.011 ***
MALE 47.5% 0.368 *** 0.367 *** 0.331 ***
HH_INC (ln) 88.0 0.089 *** 0.085 *** 0.027 ***
MIDDLE 45% 0.122 *** 0.113 *** 0.053 ***
RICH 23% 0.219 *** 0.198 *** 0.105 ***
Plan design features offered
NFUNDS 17.7 0.013 ** -0.001
NFUNDS2 495.1 0.000 0.000
INDEX 99% -0.13 -0.15
INTL 98% -0.008 0.002
CS 52% 0.105 *** 0.051
BROK 5% 0.178 ** 0.138 *
LC 47% -0.028 0.042
LOAN 85% -0.069 -0.101
EECONTRIB 94% 0.180 0.147
PLANASSETS 414,818 0.021 0.005
Account holdings (Dec 2002)
WEB 37% 0.890 ***
NFUNDS_HELD 3.5 0.075 ***
INDEX_HELD 53% -0.179 ***
INTL_HELD 20% -0.165 ***
CS_HELD 32% 0.026
BROK_HELD 0% 0.725 ***
LC_HELD 12% -0.180 ***
LOAN_HELD 11% 0.009
Observations 1,186,554 1,186,554 1,186,554
-log(L) 118,962 117,942 105,206
Pseudo R-squared 5.0% 5.8% 15.9%
Chi-square 2,040 *** 25,473 ***
All models are Probits.
***: significant at the 1% confidence level
**: significant at the 5% confidence level
*: significant at the 10% confidence level
Sector variables and missing dummy variables included but not reported.
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Appendix Table A3.  Multivariate Analysis of the Number of Trades: Regression Coefficients for 
Traders and Non-Traders 
 
Negative binomial model specification
(A) -- Demographics only
(B) -- Demographics and plan design features offered
(C) -- Demographics, plan design and account holdings on Dec. 2002
Mean                  NTRADES (mean: 0.6)
Demographics (A) (B) (C) 
AGE 43.5 0.009 *** 0.011 *** 0.015 ***
TENURE 8.0 0.031 *** 0.028 *** 0.020 ***
MALE 47.5% 0.648 *** 0.637 *** 0.488 ***
HH_INC (ln) 88.0 0.185 *** 0.182 *** 0.091 ***
MIDDLE 45% 0.273 *** 0.262 *** 0.159 ***
RICH 23% 0.462 *** 0.436 *** 0.293 ***
Plan design features offered
NFUNDS 17.7 0.019 -0.006
NFUNDS2 495.1 0.000 0.000
INDEX 99% -0.88 ** -1.19 ***
INTL 98% 0.264 * 0.243 **
CS 52% 0.217 *** 0.098
BROK 5% 0.376 *** 0.237 *
LC 47% -0.014 0.090
LOAN 85% -0.165 -0.187 **
EECONTRIB 94% 0.489 * 0.410
PLANASSETS 414,818 0.021 -0.001
Account holdings (Dec 2002)
WEB 37% 1.567 ***
NFUNDS_HELD 3.5 0.115 ***
INDEX_HELD 53% -0.218 ***
INTL_HELD 20% -0.215 ***
CS_HELD 32% 0.084
BROK_HELD 0% 0.918 ***
LC_HELD 12% -0.269 ***
LOAN_HELD 11% -0.018
Observations 1,186,554 1,186,554 1,186,554
-log(L) 198,002 194,814 145,927
Pseudo R-squared 9.1% 10.5% 33.0%
Chi-square 6,376 *** 97,773 ***
All models are negative binomial regressions.
***: significant at the 1% confidence level
**: significant at the 5% confidence level
*: significant at the 10% confidence level
Sector variables and missing dummy variables included but not reported.  
  
33
Appendix Table A4.  Multivariate Analysis of Portfolio Turnover : Regression Coefficients for  
Traders and Non-Traders 
 
Censored Tobit specification
(A) -- Demographics only
(B) -- Demographics and plan design features offered
(C) -- Demographics, plan design and account holdings on Dec. 2002
Mean             TURNOVER (mean: 18.4%)
Demographics (A) (B) (C) 
AGE 43.5 0.010 *** 0.012 *** 0.020 ***
TENURE 8.0 0.035 *** 0.034 *** 0.023 ***
MALE 47.5% 0.687 *** 0.681 *** 0.514 ***
HH_INC (ln) 88.0 0.283 *** 0.279 *** 0.151 ***
MIDDLE 45% 0.393 *** 0.374 *** 0.233 ***
RICH 23% 0.668 *** 0.634 *** 0.409 ***
Plan design features offered
NFUNDS 17.7 0.017 *** -0.011 ***
NFUNDS2 495.1 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
INDEX 99% -2.512 *** -2.651 ***
INTL 98% 0.480 *** 0.471 ***
CS 52% 0.182 *** 0.040 ***
BROK 5% 0.417 *** 0.269 ***
LC 47% -0.012 0.113 ***
LOAN 85% -0.210 *** -0.214 ***
EECONTRIB 94% 0.574 *** 0.502 ***
PLANASSETS 414,818 0.025 *** -0.013 ***
Account holdings (Dec 2002)
WEB 37% 1.931 ***
NFUNDS_HELD 3.5 0.095 ***
INDEX_HELD 53% -0.233 ***
INTL_HELD 20% -0.205 ***
CS_HELD 32% 0.155 ***
BROK_HELD 0% 1.106 ***
LC_HELD 12% -0.281 ***
LOAN_HELD 11% -0.103 ***
Observations 1,186,554 1,186,554 1,186,554
-log(L) 916,762 913,795 880,451
Pseudo R2 1.7% 2.1% 5.6%
Likelihood ratio test1 5,933 *** 66,689 ***
All models are censored Tobit regressions.
***: significant at the 1% confidence level
**: significant at the 5% confidence level
*: significant at the 10% confidence level
1: Likelihood test is to compare the models: B with A, C with B. 
Sector variables and missing dummy variables included but not reported.  
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Endnotes 
1 Mitchell, Utkus, and Yang (2005) provide a review.  
2 In the US there are three times as many workers participating in DC plans today compared to defined 
benefit (DB) plans and DB assets (at $2.2 trillion) are now less than DC assets (Vanguard, 2004).   
3 Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) provide an excellent summary of the debate.  They also conclude that there 
is no evidence of age-based trading away from equities. 
4 For example, most of the participants in our dataset received an initial investor questionnaire that, if 
completed, recommended a target asset allocation based on the investor’s time horizon, risk tolerance 
and other factors such as job security.  Rebalancing was also recommended as an annual strategy.  More 
generally, Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2002) discuss how investors’ risk tolerance and ability to recover 
from losses declines with age, implying a shift toward conservative assets over time.  The Certified 
Financial Planner (CFP; Tacchino and Littell, 1999) and the Certified Financial Analyst curricula (CFA; 
Bronson, Scanlan and Squires, forthcoming; and Maginn et al. forthcoming) emphasize the importance 
of life stage and time horizon in investors’ ability to take risk. Writers who link age to equity exposure 
include Brennan (2002) and Evensky (1997). 
5 Active traders in their study posted an average annual return of 11.4% versus the average annual return 
of 16.4% for all households and a average annual return of 17.9% for the market. 
6 This figure is our calculation from reported regression results. 
7 Barber, Lee, Liu and Odean (2004) also find that in a study of market trading from Taiwan, trading is a 
zero-sum game, with profits gained by institutional investors exactly equal to losses incurred by 
individuals.   
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8 According to the joint Employee Benefit Research Institute/Investment Company Institute (EBRI/ICI) 
data base of defined contribution plan participants (Holden and VanDerhei, 2004), participants held 67% 
of their assets in equities as of December 2003, the month prior to the beginning of our sample period.   
9 Mitchell, Utkus, and Yang (2005) describe how plan features influence savings behavior. 
10 This file is taken from a larger dataset of more than 2,000 plans and 2.5 million participant accounts. 
Our selection criteria identified those individuals who were active participants in their 401(k) plans over 
the 24-month window, and who were in plans in continuous existence over the same period.    
11 Lifecycle funds are investment options designed to provide “one stop” portfolio diversification in a 
single fund.  They are typically offered as a series within a plan.  Static allocation funds offer a range of 
funds based on risk characteristics (e.g., conservative, moderate, aggressive), while target maturity funds 
are based on an expected retirement date (the 2005 fund, the 2015 fund, the 2025 fund, etc.), with equity 
allocations higher for longer-dated funds, and automatic reductions in equity exposure over time. 
12 In a 401(k) brokerage option, participants may transfer all or a portion of their account assets 
(depending on plan rules) to a brokerage account within the plan.  They may invest in mutual funds, 
exchange traded funds, individual stocks and bonds or other securities (again depending on the 
restrictions imposed by the plan).  They incur retail-level brokerage commissions for their investment 
transactions. 
13 We use the term “401(k) plan” interchangeable with “defined contribution plan,” recognizing that 
there are other types of employee-contributory plans, such as 403(b) plans for non-profits, as well as 
employer-only contributory plans, including standalone profit-sharing and money purchase plans.  
Omitted are standalone Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) since by law they are mainly 
invested in employer stock.   
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14 This is true for the 401(k) world more generally—cf. Mitchell et al. (2005).  
15 We use the terms “participant” and “participant account” interchangeably here, though in practice 4% 
of the participants in our sample have accounts with different plans.    
16 This average balance is much higher than balances reported by other sources (for instance, Vanguard 
reported an average 2002 year-end balance of just over $45,000 for all its plans). The reason is that our 
sample includes only active contributors continuously participating in their employers’ plans over the 
two-year period of interest; hence it excludes small accounts of job changers and inactive participants.  
17 Data from the IXI company are used to impute non-retirement household financial wealth at the 
ZIP+4 level.  The data, which are categorical in nature, are collapsed into three groupings as follows: 
poor (wealth < $7,280), middle class (wealth between $7,280 and $61,289), and rich (wealth >$ 61,289).    
18 Sponsors may terminate money managers not only due to concerns about performance but also due to 
changes in the manager’s investment objectives, style, investment process, staffing or organization.  On 
the fiduciary front, some sponsors in our sample period terminated certain third-party money managers 
who had failed to adequately control market timing within their funds. 
19 This is likely a lower-bound estimate of sponsor-initiated trading, since participants may have several 
months’ notice of plans for fund deletions, and some may trade after the actual mapping of funds.  
20 Participants can also alter their “contribution allocations” or way in which future contributions are to 
be invested, but this is not our focus in the current paper.   
21 In practice, we first calculate the dollar amount for each trade as the average of (positive) purchase 
and sale amounts; next we sum up this dollar amount of all trades as the total trade amount; then we 
divide the total trade amount the average of the beginning and ending balance for the two-year period.   
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22 We recognize that comparing plan participants to fund managers is to a large extent an apples-to-
oranges comparison.  Participants are not full-time money managers.  Moreover, the average 401(k) 
investor holds a balanced portfolio of both equity and fixed income securities, and hence he or she 
manages a less risky portfolio than the average US equity fund manager.   
23 All regression models also include industry controls.  The three largest sectors include manufacturing 
with 31% of the sample; business, professional and non-profit services account with 22%; and finance, 
real estate and insurance at 10%. 
24 For instance the equation for model C is ( ) == ACCTPDDEMOTRADINGE ji ,,|1,  
( ) )(,,|1Pr ,32,1, jikjiji ACCTPDDEMOACCTPDDEMOTRADING βββ ++Φ=== where Φ is the 
cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution.   
25 The negative binomial model is a Poisson model whose parameter is drawn from a Gamma 
distribution; the closed-form expression of the distribution is expressed as: 
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where Γ is a Gamma function with parameters θ and 
u, θ
λα ji ,= , ( ) jijijjiji ACCTPDDEMONTRADESE ,,,, ,,| λθα == , and 
( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ +=+= jijijijjiji ACCTPDDEMONTRADESVar ,,,,, 11)1(,,| λθλαθα . 
26 The first three models use error correction to adjust for plan-level heteroskedasticity.  For the 
TURNOVER model, a two-stage Heckman selection model does not produce a statistically significant 
coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio for the second-stage regression. A censored Tobit model with error 
correction fails to converge, probably due to the enormous size of the dataset.   
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27  Marginal effects for continuous variables use either one standard deviation change in the dependent 
variable (e.g. 7 more years of tenure, $60,000 more household income) or an intuitively appealing 
change in the unit of analysis (e.g. 10 more years of age).  To evaluate changes in the account holdings, 
we set the corresponding plan design variables to 1 (e.g. to assess the impact of more company stock 
holdings, we set the ‘company stock offered’ variable to 1).  We exclude from Table 5 two statistically 
significant plan design variables, the offering of index funds and international funds, since virtually all 
participants are offered such options, and few plan sponsors are likely to eliminate them. Hence the 
variation in our data is likely due to some idiosyncratic behavior associated with handful of plans 
lacking these choices. 
28 As shown in the Appendix Tables, it is worth noting at the outset that goodness-of-fit measures 
improve dramatically as the specifications are made more elaborate. For example, in the TRADER 
equation, the pseudo-R2 of the demographics-only model (A) is 3.4% which rises to 11.6% for model C.  
Similarly the pseudo-R2 for NTRADES increases from 9.1% (model A) to 33% (for model C).  The 
TURNOVER model has the lowest R2, ranging from 1.7% to 5.6%. 
29 Bernheim (1998) noted a spillover effect in the other direction: workplace education programs 
promoted not only 401(k) saving but also non-plan saving in the household. 
30 The brokerage account can be thought of as a “sidecar.”  Participant and employer contributions are 
first made to the regular investment options offered by the plan; participants wanting to make a 
brokerage trade must then transfer these assets from the regular fund options to the brokerage, which 
counts for a portion of the trading volume.   
